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Neurological, neuroimaging, and psychological data have 
highlighted the importance of bodily perception for a 
neurobiological model of the self and subjectivity. 
Inspired by early research on the body schema (Head & 
Holmes, 1911; Schilder, 1935), clinical researchers have 
recently described alterations of the self in cases of dis-
turbed multisensory integration (Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, 
& Seeck, 2004; Brugger, Regrad, & Landis, 1997; Heydrich 
& Blanke, 2013; Heydrich, Dieguez, Grunwald, Seeck, & 
Blanke, 2010; Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). These insights 
inspired the use of multisensory conflicts to systemati-
cally alter the perception of the body and self (Blakemore, 
Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Dieguez, 
Mercier, Newby, & Blanke, 2009; Fourneret & Jeannerod, 
1998; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007).
Alterations of the bodily self using multisensory con-
flicts have mostly affected isolated body parts—fingers 
(Dieguez et al., 2009), hands (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), 
arms (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998), and the face (Sforza, 
Bufalari, Haggard, & Aglioti, 2010)—but can also induce 
changes in the perception of the entire body (Ehrsson, 
2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007). In one illusion 
(Lenggenhager et al., 2007), participants viewed their 
own body from behind while their back was stroked. 
With synchronous stroking, participants self-identified 
with the “virtual” body and mislocalized their self toward 
where the virtual body was seen.
In these studies on the bodily self, researchers manip-
ulated only exteroceptive sources of information about 
the body (i.e., vision and touch). However, evidence has 
been put forward that the brain’s representations of inter-
nal bodily states (interoceptive processes; e.g., Critchley, 
Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004) are equally or 
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Abstract
Prominent theories highlight the importance of bodily perception for self-consciousness, but it is currently not known 
whether bodily perception is based on interoceptive or exteroceptive signals or on integrated signals from these 
anatomically distinct systems. In the research reported here, we combined both types of signals by surreptitiously 
providing participants with visual exteroceptive information about their heartbeat: A real-time video image of a 
periodically illuminated silhouette outlined participants’ (projected, “virtual”) bodies and flashed in synchrony with 
their heartbeats. We investigated whether these “cardio-visual” signals could modulate bodily self-consciousness and 
tactile perception. We report two main findings. First, synchronous cardio-visual signals increased self-identification 
with and self-location toward the virtual body, and second, they altered the perception of tactile stimuli applied to 
participants’ backs so that touch was mislocalized toward the virtual body. We argue that the integration of signals from 
the inside and the outside of the human body is a fundamental neurobiological process underlying self-consciousness.
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even more important for the self (Craig, 2002; Damasio, 
2000). Although recent work with a patient with bilateral-
insula and anterior-cingulate-cortex lesions has suggested 
that exteroceptive and interoceptive signals can be inte-
grated (Khalsa, Rudrauf, Feinstein, & Tranel, 2009), until 
now, no one has investigated how these signals interact 
to jointly affect bodily self-consciousness. This is surpris-
ing, given what is known about the convergence of vis-
ceral and somatosensory signals in single neurons in the 
spinal cord, brain stem, and thalamus (Foreman, Blair, & 
Weber, 1984; Takahashi & Yokota, 1983) and clinical data 
from patients with coronary heart disease and referred 
heart pain (Ruch, 1965).
We therefore developed an experimental setup to 
investigate whether a conflict between an interoceptive 
signal (the heartbeat) and an exteroceptive (visual) signal 
would modulate bodily self-consciousness and whether 
this “cardio-visual” conflict would also alter exterocep-
tion (tactile perception), as measured using the cross-
modal-congruency task (Spence, Pavani, & Driver, 2004). 
We presented cardio-visual illumination of the virtual 
body in which a flashing silhouette was either temporally 
synchronous or asynchronous with respect to the partici-
pant’s heartbeat. We predicted that participants would 
feel greater self-identification with the virtual body, that 
participants would self-locate more toward the virtual 
body, and that tactile stimuli would be mislocalized 
toward the virtual body more in the synchronous condi-
tion than in the asynchronous condition.
Method
Participants
Seventeen healthy right-handed participants took part (9 
women, 8 men; mean age = 26.7 years, SD = 5.6 years). 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and had no history of neurological or psychiatric condi-
tions. They gave written informed consent and were 
financially compensated in return for participating. The 
protocol was approved by the local ethics committee—La 
Commission d’éthique de la recherche Clinique de la 
Faculté de Biologie et de Médecine—at the University of 
Lausanne (Lausanne, Switzerland) and was performed in 
accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 
Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials and procedure
Setup, electrocardiogram (ECG), and signal analy-
sis.  The present protocol was an adaptation of an 
experimental setup that was previously used (Aspell, 
Lenggenhager, & Blanke, 2009; Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggen-
hager et al., 2007). Participants stood with their backs 
facing a video camera placed 2 m behind them. The 
video, showing the participant’s body (virtual body), was 
projected in the body conditions in real time onto a head-
mounted display worn by the participants (see Fig. 1). 
In the object conditions, participants viewed a real- 
time video of a rectangular object with height and width 
dimensions similar to those of a human body (see Fig. 
S1A in the Supplemental Material available online).
While filming the video, we also recorded the partici-
pant’s ECG. Raw data (ECG) were acquired with the 
BioSemi Active II system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands) at a sampling rate of 2048 Hz. In-house 
software was developed to detect, in real time, the peak 
of each R wave from the ECG data and to trigger an addi-
tional visual stimulus (a flashing outline surrounding the 
participant’s virtual body) that flashed on and off syn-
chronously or asynchronously with respect to the partici-
pant’s heartbeat (for further details, see Section 1 of the 
Supplemental Material). Note that it was only the syn-
chrony of the flashing outline that was manipulated 
across blocks; the participant’s body (or object) was 
always displayed in real time—that is, synchronously. 
Participants were not informed about the synchrony 
manipulation, nor were they told that the visual flashing 
was related to their heartbeat; however, there was an 
item in an administered questionnaire (“It seemed as if 
the flashing semitransparent template was my heartbeat”; 
see the following section and Table 1 for details) that 
alluded to this relation. We did not measure heartbeat 
awareness or sensitivity because doing so may have 
drawn attention to the synchrony manipulation. There 
were four blocks corresponding to four conditions: (a) 
body synchronous (BS; body with flashing outline syn-
chronous with the heartbeat), (b) body asynchronous 
(BAS; body with asynchronous flashing outline), (c) 
object synchronous (OS; object with synchronous flash-
ing outline), and (d) object asynchronous (OAS; object 
with asynchronous flashing outline).
Self-identification and self-location.  At the end of 
each block, we administered an 11-item questionnaire 
adapted from Lenggenhager et al. (2007; see Table 1). 
The items were randomly ordered, and responses were 
made using 7-point Likert scales from −3 (complete dis-
agreement) to 3 (complete agreement).
At the end of each block (duration = approximately 
6 min), we measured self-location as described in 
Lenggenhager et al. (2007). Participants were passively 
moved backward 1.5 m (the experimenter gently guided 
the participants—who had their eyes closed—while they 
took very small steps). They were then asked to return to 
their initial position (with eyes closed) with normal-sized 
steps. The distance between the original position and 
the position estimated by the participant (drift) was 
measured.








Fig. 1.  Experimental setup for the body conditions. Participants (a) stood with their backs facing a video 
camera placed 200 cm behind them (b). The video showing the participant’s body (his or her “virtual 
body”) was projected in real time onto a head-mounted display. An electrocardiogram was recorded, 
and R peaks were detected in real time (c), triggering a flashing silhouette outlining the participant’s 
virtual body (d). The display made it appear as though the virtual body was standing 200 cm in front 
of the participant (e). After each block, participants were passively displaced 150 cm backward to the 
camera and were instructed to walk back to the original position. See also Figure S1 and Movie S1 in the 
Supplemental Material.
Table 1.  Questionnaire Items
1. It seemed as if I was feeling the vibration where I saw the virtual body/object.
2. It seemed as though I was in two places at the same time.
3. I felt as if the virtual body/object was my body.
4. It seemed as if the vibration I was feeling came from somewhere between my own body and the virtual body/object.
5. It felt as if my (real) body was drifting toward the front (toward the virtual body/object).
6. It appeared (visually) as if the virtual body/object was drifting backward (toward my body).
7. It seemed as if I might have more than one body.
8. It seemed as if the flashing semitransparent template was my heartbeat.
9. I felt as if my heart was in the virtual body/object.
10. It seemed as if I had two hearts.
11. It seemed as if I was feeling my heartbeat where I saw the semitransparent template flashing.
Note: Each of these items was placed in the following frame: “During the experiment, there were times when. . . .” Responses were 
made using 7-point Likert scales from −3 (complete disagreement) to 3 (complete agreement).
Tactile perception: the cross-modal-congruency 
effect (CCE).  To measure the effect of cardio-visual stim-
ulation on tactile perception, we adapted our previous 
setup that allowed us to measure visuo-tactile CCEs 
(Aspell et al., 2009; for further details, see Section 1 of the 
Supplemental Material). In the cross-modal-congruency 
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task, participants must make speeded judgments of the 
elevation of tactile stimuli while attempting to ignore visual 
distractors. The CCE can be used as an index of the per-
ceived proximity of tactile and visual stimuli (Spence et al., 
2004). The CCE was measured in both body and object 
conditions. Participants were instructed to keep their eyes 
open, fixate a location in the middle of their backs as 
viewed via the head-mounted display, and to wait for the 
first vibro-tactile and light-emitting-diode (LED) stimuli 
(presented 1 min after the start of the trial).
To measure the CCE, we used four light-vibration 
devices, each consisting of a small vibrating motor paired 
with a single bright LED. The two upper devices were 
positioned at the inner edges of the shoulder blades, and 
the two lower devices were positioned 9 cm below the 
upper devices. In the object conditions, the LEDs were 
taped onto the object at the same height from the ground 
and at the same relative distances as the vibrators on the 
participants’ backs. Each trial consisted of a light (LED) 
flash followed by a vibro-tactile stimulus. The light-vibra-
tion devices from which the LED flashes and vibrations 
were emitted varied randomly and independently from 
trial to trial. Participants had to indicate, by pressing one 
of two buttons as fast as possible, whether they felt a 
vibration at the top or at the bottom of their backs 
(regardless of side) while trying to ignore the light flashes. 
There were four conditions (with 25 trials each), which 
differed in the relative locations of the target vibrator and 
the distractor LED: (a) same side, congruent elevation; 
(b) same side, incongruent elevation; (c) different side, 
congruent elevation; and (d) and different side, incon-
gruent elevation. We analyzed reaction times (RTs) and 
accuracy in each condition.
Statistical analysis
To assess illusion strength, we first compared the subjec-
tive ratings for the illusion items (Items 1–3) with the 
ratings for the control items (Items 4–11) in the four 
experimental conditions using a two-tailed, three-way 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
body (body vs. object), synchrony (synchronous vs. 
asynchronous), and item type (illusion vs. control) as 
within-subject factors, following methods used in previ-
ous research (Morgan et al., 2011; Palluel, Aspell, 
Lavanchy, & Blanke, 2012; Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, 
& Sanchez-Vives, 2008). To follow up on the ANOVA 
results, we carried out planned comparisons using paired 
t tests. On the basis of previous work (Botvinick & Cohen, 
1998; Ionta et al., 2011; Lenggenhager et al., 2007), we 
postulated the a priori hypothesis of higher subjective 
ratings for the illusion items in the BS condition com-
pared with the BAS condition and no such difference for 
the control items in the object conditions. We adjusted 
the significance level (alpha) used for multiple compari-
sons using the Bonferroni method (p = .0125).
In a second step, we focused on the differences among 
the ratings for the illusion items (in particular, Item 3: “I 
felt as if the virtual body/object was my body”) by per-
forming planned comparisons between the BS and BAS 
conditions, the OS and OAS conditions, the BS and OS 
conditions, and the BAS and OAS conditions using paired 
t tests. Again, we expected higher ratings in the BS condi-
tion compared with the BAS condition and generally 
higher ratings in the body conditions compared with the 
object conditions but no significant difference between 
the object conditions. Moreover, to check that the 
observed effects were not due to participants’ awareness 
of the manipulation, we analyzed responses to Item 8 (“It 
seemed as if the flashing semitransparent template was 
my heartbeat”) using the same contrasts. We adjusted the 
significance level using the Bonferroni method (p = .003).
We analyzed the drift (self-location) measures (calcu-
lated relative to the initial position = 0) using a repeated 
measures ANOVA with body (body vs. object) and syn-
chrony (synchronous vs. asynchronous) entered as fac-
tors. We analyzed the RTs and the accuracy data of the 
cross-modal-congruency task using body (body vs. 
object), synchrony (synchronous vs. asynchronous), side 
(same side vs. different side), and congruency (congru-
ent vs. incongruent) as factors. We here focus on the RTs 
rather than accuracy, given that RT data have been shown 
to be more sensitive for CCE analysis (Austen, Soto-
Faraco, Enns, & Kingstone, 2004; Shore, Barnes, & 
Spence, 2006; Spence et al., 2004). Fisher’s least-signifi-
cant-difference test was used for post hoc testing, and the 
significance level used was p = .05. Three participants 
were excluded from CCE analysis (1 participant was 
excluded because of chance-level performance, and 2 
participants were excluded because of technical prob-
lems). This resulted in a total sample of 14 participants 
for the CCE analysis. Trials with incorrect responses and 
trials on which participants failed to respond within 1,500 
ms were discarded from RT analysis (Aspell et al., 2009; 
Spence et al., 2004). We also determined heart-rate vari-
ability from the ECG data by calculating the standard 
deviation of the average R–R intervals for each condition 
(Cowan, 1995) using repeated measures ANOVAs with 
body (body vs. object) and synchrony (synchronous vs. 
asynchronous) as the factors.
Results
Self-identification
The mean scores for Item 3 are shown in Figure 2a. 
We investigated the effects of seeing a body and 
synchronous cardio-visual stimulation on illusion strength 
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(average scores for Items 1–3) using a 2 × 2 × 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA. We found a significant main effect of 
body (N = 17), F(1, 16) = 38.11, p < .001, ηp
2 = .704; and 
item type (N = 17), F(1, 16) = 13.14, p = .02, ηp
2 = .451; 
as well as a Body × Item Type interaction (N = 17), 
F(1, 16) = 20.1, p < .001, ηp
2 = .557; and a Body × 
Synchrony × Item Type interaction (N = 17), F(1, 16) = 
4.36, p = .053, ηp
2 = .214. Using planned comparisons, we 
showed with further analysis that the overall illusion was 
stronger in the BS condition than the BAS condition (p = 
.01, one-tailed). No significant differences between the 
average scores for the control items in the BS and BAS 
conditions or for any type of item in the object conditions 
were found (all ps > .08, one-tailed).
Subsequent analysis focusing on mean responses to 
Items 1 through 3 revealed that self-identification with 
the virtual body (Item 3; see Fig. 2a) was stronger in the 
BS condition (M = 0.88) than in the BAS condition (M = 
−0.12; p = .002, one-tailed) or in the OS condition (M = 
−2.29; p < .001, one-tailed), and stronger in the BAS con-
dition than in the OAS condition (M = −2.41; p < .001, 
one-tailed). No significant difference was found between 
the OS and OAS conditions (p = .33, one-tailed). Analysis 






























































Fig. 2.  Results. The graph in (a) shows mean scores for an item measuring self-identification (Item 3: 
“I felt as if the body/object was my body”) as a function of condition. The graph in (b) shows mean 
scores for an item measuring subjective heartbeat awareness (Item 8: “It seemed as if the flashing semi-
transparent template was my heartbeat”) as a function of condition. The graph in (c) shows the average 
distance between the place where participants were originally standing and the place they moved to 
when asked to return there (drift, a measure of self-location), as a function of condition. Finally, the 
graph in (d) shows mean reaction times (RTs, a measure of the cross-modal congruency effect) as a 
function of condition. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. For a graph showing scores on all 
other questionnaire items, see Figure S3 in the Supplemental Material. Sync = synchronous condition; 
Async = asynchronous condition.
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aware of the experimental manipulation (mean ratings 
across all conditions were negative, and no significant 
difference was observed between the conditions; all ps > 
.07, one-tailed; see Fig. 2b).
Self-location
Cardio-visual signals also altered self-location (as shown 
in Fig. 2c): It was modulated by cardio-visual synchrony 
but only in the body conditions. Statistical analysis 
revealed no significant main effects of body (N = 17), F(1, 
16) = 1.10, p = .31, ηp
2 = .064, or of synchrony (N = 17), 
F(1, 16) = 0.38, p = .54, ηp
2 = .023. However, statistical 
analysis did reveal a significant two-way interaction 
between body and synchrony (N = 17), F(1, 16) = 8.93, 
p < .01, ηp
2 = .358. This was caused by a significant dif-
ference between the BS condition (M = 10.0 cm; SD = 
24.6 cm) and the BAS condition (M = −1.0 cm; SD = 
20.3 cm; p = .02). Further analysis revealed that self-loca-
tion differed from zero only in the BS condition (p = .05), 
not in the BAS condition (p = .41). In the object conditions, 
changes in self-location were smaller and did not differ 
from zero (all ps > .24); they also did not differ between 
the OS condition (M = −3.2 cm; SD = 22.9 cm) and the 
OAS condition (M = 3.9 cm; SD = 22.4 cm; p = .11).
Tactile perception
Figure 2d shows that CCEs were larger under conditions 
of cardio-visual synchrony. Statistical analysis revealed 
significant main effects of body (N = 14), F(1, 13) = 8.73, 
p = .01, ηp
2 = .402, and congruency, F(1, 13) = 69.097, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .842, as well as a significant two-way Side 
× Congruency interaction, F(1, 13) = 40.75, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .758, but no significant Body × Synchrony interac-
tion, F(1, 13) = 2.224, p = .16. A significant three-way 
Synchrony × Congruency × Side interaction was also 
found, F(1, 13) = 7.57, p = .02, ηp
2 = .368 (see Fig. S2 in 
the Supplemental Material). No significant interactions 
were found among body, synchrony, and congruency, 
F(1, 13) = 0.827, p = .38, or among body, synchrony, and 
side, F(1, 13) = 0.029, p = .87. Furthermore, no significant 
four-way interactions among congruency, side, syn-
chrony, and body were found, F(1, 13) = 0.0302, p = .87. 
For further discussion of CCE data, see Sections 2 and 3 
of the Supplemental Material.
An ANOVA on the accuracy data revealed significant 
main effects of body, F(1, 13) = 17.91, p < .01; of side, 
F(1, 13) = 16.52, p < .01; and of congruency, F(1, 13) = 
21.5, p < .01. There was also a significant Body × 
Congruency interaction, F(1, 13) = 4.82, p = .04, and a 
significant Side × Congruency interaction, F(1, 13) = 6.55, 
p = .02. No other main effects or interactions reached 
significance.
Further analysis revealed that these differences in tac-
tile perception and bodily self-consciousness were not 
related to changes in heart physiology: An ANOVA com-
paring the heart-rate variability (standard deviation of the 
average R–R intervals) across conditions did not reveal 
any significant main effects or interactions among the BS 
(59 ms, SD = 49 ms), BAS (44 ms, SD = 14 ms), OS (59 
ms, SD = 58 ms), and OAS (69 ± 85 ms) conditions (all 
ps > .33; see Fig. S2C in the Supplemental Material). 
Moreover, no significant main effects or interactions were 
found for the heart rate (R-peak-to-R-peak interval) 
among the BS (666 ms, SD = 59 ms), BAS (675 ms, SD = 
44 ms), OS (684 ms, SD = 59 ms), or OAS (677 ms, SD = 
69 ms) conditions (all ps > .4).
Discussion
The present study allows us to draw several conclusions. 
The data demonstrate that participants experienced 
stronger self-identification and a greater shift in self-loca-
tion when an illuminating silhouette surrounding a video 
image of their body flashed on and off synchronously 
with their heartbeat. This is the first time that an extero-
interoceptive conflict has been used to modulate bodily 
self-consciousness and tactile perception. In earlier stud-
ies, purely exteroceptive conflicts (Aspell et al., 2009; 
Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Zopf, Savage, & Williams, 
2010) were used to manipulate bodily self-consciousness, 
whereas in a recent study, a type of extero-interoceptive 
conflict (attenuating tactile heartbeat sensations using a 
topical anesthetic) was used to enable investigation of 
the neural pathways mediating heartbeat awareness 
(Khalsa et al., 2009). Our findings are compatible with 
proposals that exteroceptive (Blanke et al., 2004; Blanke 
& Metzinger, 2009) and interoceptive signals (Craig, 2002; 
Damasio, 2000; Tsakiris, Jimenez, & Costantini, 2011) are 
important for the representation of self in the brain.
It has been proposed that the illusory feeling of own-
ership over rubber hands and virtual bodies (Botvinick & 
Cohen, 1998; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Moseley, Gallace, 
& Spence, 2012) is at least partly explained by the fact 
that touch is inherently self-specifying sensory informa-
tion (Bermudez, 1995) because tactile stimuli necessarily 
provide information about one’s own body (whereas, 
e.g., visual signals do not). Interoceptive signals are also 
self-specifying sensory signals and, in addition, are reaf-
ferent signals, that is, afferent signals arising from the 
organism’s own efferent processes—more specifically, 
arising from the organism’s own visceral motor-control 
processes rather than from the external environment 
(Christoff, Cosmelli, Legrand, & Thompson, 2011). Given 
this, we argue that in conditions in which synchronous 
heartbeat-timing information is presented to the partici-
pant, albeit via an unusual route (vision), it increases 
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self-identification with the virtual body relative to condi-
tions in which the visual information is asynchronous.
We did not directly test interoceptive sensitivity (with 
a heartbeat-counting discrimination task), but we found 
no significant difference between ratings in the synchro-
nous and asynchronous conditions for Item 8: “It seemed 
that the flashing semitransparent template was my heart-
beat.” Interoception can of course include cases of both 
conscious and nonconscious processing of heartbeat 
signals. Moreover, participants can sometimes perform 
above chance level on interoceptive “awareness” tasks, 
such as heartbeat-discrimination tasks (e.g., Critchley et 
al., 2004), even when they are not conscious of the heart-
beat sensations (Ceunen, Van Diest, & Vlaeyen, 2013). 
Given the questionnaire data, it appears that in the 
present study, the nonconscious detection of heartbeat 
signals was driving the synchrony effects for most 
participants.
It is notable that these effects on bodily self-conscious-
ness (self-identification and self-location) were observed 
only when the flashing outline appeared on a video 
image of the participant’s body, not when it appeared on 
an object. The cardio-visual-synchrony effect is therefore 
not sufficient on its own to cause changes in bodily self-
consciousness: The visual object must resemble a body. 
Similar findings have been reported by researchers using 
visuo-tactile stimulation of bodies (Lenggenhager et al., 
2007) and hands (Haans, IJsselsteijn, & de Kort, 2008; 
Tsakiris, Carpenter, James, & Fotopoulou, 2010; Tsakiris 
& Haggard, 2005). Top-down mechanisms that refer to 
stored information about typical human body form are 
likely recruited for these illusions to occur: Multisensory 
congruence alone is not sufficient (Makin, Holmes, & 
Ehrsson, 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2010).
Our visuo-tactile CCE data extend our data on changes 
in bodily self-consciousness but also reveal different 
effects of cardio-visual synchrony on the CCE. By mea-
suring the magnitude of the CCE (focusing on RT data) 
during cardio-visual stimulation, we directly tested 
whether cardio-visual signals would alter the perception 
of exteroceptive tactile cues applied to the body surface 
of participants during the illusion. On the basis of previ-
ous work showing that visuo-tactile stroking alters CCE 
magnitude (Aspell et al., 2009; Zopf et al., 2010) in condi-
tions that induce changes in self-identification and self-
location, we predicted that cardio-visual synchrony can 
induce similar changes.
Previous studies have shown that the CCE is sensitive 
to the perceived spatial proximity between the (tactile) 
targets and (visual) distractors by demonstrating that the 
CCE is larger—that is, visual interference in responses to 
tactile stimuli is greater—when the visual distractors and 
tactile targets are presented on the same side (closer to 
each other) than when they are presented on different 
sides. The condition with the greater perceived proximity 
between visual and tactile stimuli should show a bigger 
difference between same-side and different-side CCEs 
(Aspell et al., 2009; Pavani, Spence, & Driver, 2000; 
Spence et al., 2004). Our data revealed that the difference 
between the same-side and different-side CCEs was big-
ger and more significant in the synchronous condition 
than in the asynchronous condition and therefore show 
that the tactile stimuli were perceived as being closer in 
space to the visual distractors (seen on the virtual body 
or object in front of the participants) in the synchronous 
condition.
These CCE changes were of similar magnitude to 
those observed when the full-body illusion was induced 
using exteroceptive conflicts (Aspell et al., 2009); how-
ever, in contrast to the self-location and self-identification 
measures, the effect of cardio-visual synchrony on the 
CCE was present regardless of whether the participant’s 
body or the object was viewed. On the basis of results 
from previous work in which visuo-tactile stimulation 
was used (Aspell et al., 2009), we predicted that CCE 
magnitude would have also been modulated by cardio-
visual synchrony in a body-specific manner. In our previ-
ous CCE study, we found that CCE changes due to 
visuo-tactile stimulation were body specific; the lack of 
body specificity due to cardio-visual illumination in the 
present study was likely due to differences between the 
visuo-tactile and the cardio-visual conflict. Thus, during 
visuo-tactile synchronous stroking, stimuli that are felt on 
the participant’s body are associated with what the par-
ticipant sees on the virtual stimulus (body or object).
Synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation provides stimuli 
that are temporally congruent and spatially incongruent 
(because of the 2-m distance between the participant’s 
body and where the filmed body is seen). In addition, the 
body conditions are visually congruent because the par-
ticipant sees a body being touched (while the partici-
pant’s body is touched). This is not the case in the object 
conditions: These are visually incongruent because the 
participant sees an object being touched while the par-
ticipant’s body is touched. During synchronous cardio-
visual illumination, stimuli are also temporally congruent 
and spatially incongruent, as during visuo-tactile stimula-
tion. Yet the stimuli are always visually incongruent—
regardless of whether the body or the object is shown— 
because cardiac events are not perceived on the body as 
tactile cues are. Thus, in the case of cardio-visual illumina-
tion, body and object conditions are equivalent in the 
sense that both are visually incongruent. We argue that this 
accounts for the observed absence of the body-specific 
modulation of visuo-tactile CCEs in the present study.
The synchrony-dependent alteration in the spatial per-
ception of tactile stimuli does, however, suggest that car-
dio-visual signals interfere with how tactile signals are 
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integrated in the brain. The CCE data in the present study 
therefore also extend findings of cardio-tactile conver-
gence in the spinal cord, brain stem, and thalamus and of 
the integration of cardiac signals with exteroceptive sig-
nals at higher, likely cortical levels of processing (Holzl, 
Moltner, & Neidig, 1998; Takahashi & Yokota, 1983). 
Viscero-somatic convergence has been observed in the 
spinal cord, the brain stem, and the thalamus, revealing 
single neurons with tactile receptive fields that also 
receive afferent cardiac input (Foreman et al., 1984; 
Takahashi & Yokota, 1983). Such convergence may 
account for the referred location of visceral sensations—
for example, of heart pain—that are felt on the face 
(Ruch, 1965). Thus, afferent signals from the viscera con-
verge with somatosensory afferents from specific body 
parts (Foreman et al., 1984; Holzl et al., 1998). Although 
we could not directly test this in the present study, we 
speculate that given the anatomy of the visceral and 
visual pathways, the present cardio-visual integration is 
supported by cortical (or thalamic) structures rather than 
subthalamic or spinal structures.
In conclusion, the present data on changes in self-
identification and self-location suggest that mechanisms 
for detecting correlations between the timing of a flash-
ing visual stimulus and the heartbeat are highly sensitive 
and are able to modify aspects of bodily self-conscious-
ness. Our data show that internal and external states of 
the body are integrated and suggest that they converge 
within a common system representing the bodily self.
The brain’s detection of correlations among multisen-
sory signals is an important basis for distinguishing self 
from nonself (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Rochat & Striano, 
2000; van den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002). In the present 
paradigm, we brought interoceptive cues to the “outside,” 
which allowed us to induce a number of different fine-
grained behavioral changes. Given that our data show 
that exteroceptive and interoceptive signals are com-
bined and that they are potent modulators of bodily self-
consciousness, we propose that signals from the inside 
and the outside of the human body form an integrated 
cortical system for bodily self-consciousness.
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